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Abstract 
The analysis of the institutional features of Romanian education is necessary within the context of the general institutional 
transformations undergone by the country. Using the methodology suggested by Gonard, Joumard and Price (2007), this paper 
aims at analysing the Romanian compulsory education from the perspective of institutional efficiency and at providing a 
comparative analysis between Romania and OECD countries. The main conclusion confirms the existing gap between Romania 
and OECD developed countries requires major institutional reforms focused on matching resources to specific needs, outcome 
focused policy and managerial autonomy. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies point out the existence of a strong relationship between the accumulation of human capital via 
increased education, institutions and economic growth (Glaeser et al, 2004a). There is a connection between 
economic institutional efficiency such as the respect for property, for the free market, of interest for international 
trade and the overall national performance of national economy, which, in turn, influences the efficiency of 
education (Avemoglu et al, 2005, Hanushek and Woessmann 2010, Wolf, 2004, Easterly, 2002). For example, when 
considering the relationship between governance, educational outcomes and economic performance, Lim and 
Adams-
orks both 
ways, as education, in its turn, influences institutional quality and, furthermore, economic performances. 
Commenting on this aspect, Mamoon and Murshed (2009) argue that investment in education is a pre-requisite for 
meeting goals on institutional front. 
Current controversies regarding the increase in expenditure for education show that in order to reduce the 
differences in the level of development among countries, an increase in quantity regarding education  - that is budget 
allocation  is no longer sufficient, but an arise in quality is needed (Levin and Naylor, 2007).  
Moreover, the quality of education implies structural changes in educational institutions (Gonand, Joumard and 
Price, 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). The quality of general institutional framework  as well as governance 
indices have an impact on the development of education as these determine the use of resources, socio-economic 
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conditions and quality of human relations (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008). In other words, success in educational 
production does not primarily depend on the amount of resources spent, but on the institutional features governing 
the education process (Woessmann, 2003). There are particularly these educational institutions the ones that mainly 
determine the educational performance.  
This paper aims at analysing the Romanian compulsory education from the perspective of institutional efficiency. 
However, the analysis of the institutional features of Romanian education is necessary within the context of the 
general institutional transformations undergone by the country which have mainly resulted in inconsistent and half 
reforms that did not lead to a certain result, unstable and excessive regulations, unpredictable changes in legislation 
once a new government was elected and often dictated by several interest groups etc. (Baciu and Iacobuta, 2008). 
2. Case study on Romanian educational institutions 
Using the methodology suggested by Gonand, Joumard and Price (2007, pp. 29-47), we have evaluated the 
efficiency of Romanian educational institutions by taking into account certain institutional features of compulsory 
educational system . The aim of calculating these indicators is, on the one hand, to make a comparative cross 
analysis with the OECD countries and with the best practices in this domain in the developed countries; on the other 
hand, identifying certain institutional flaws in the  Romanian education is a challenge, considering that Romania is 
on the point of implementing a major reform of the educational system in terms of  institutional change: in this 
context, a comparative longitudinal analysis after the completion of the reform could be very interesting by 
highlighting the role of the institutional features in increasing the efficiency of education . 
In April-May 2008 a national survey has been conducted and the indicators have been calculated at national level. 
The sample size is 400 Romanian schools, representative for the population of schools in Romania. The sampling 
design is a random stratified multistage design. Primary sampling units were the localities, selected using as auxiliary 
variables the geographical region, urban/rural residence and the size of localities. The secondary sampling units were 
the schools, selected using as auxiliary variables the technical/non-
were collected using a questionnaire that was completed by a face-to-  
2.1. Description of the method for composit indicator determination 
The institutional features of compulsory education system have been grouped around three dimensions (types): 1) 
the ability to allocate resources efficiently; 2) the efficiency in budget management; and 3) market efficiency. Based 
on these dimensions, a composit indicator for comparative analysis of institutional efficiency is calculated. Each 
dimension is divided into two characteristics thus leading to six intermediate indicators.  
The composit indicator can be calculated according to two methods: the multiplicative aggregation and the 
exponential aggregation method. The former method will be presented here.  
The values for the three types of efficiency are the arithmetic mean of the transformed values of some 
intermediate indicators. Thus, the efficiency of resource allocation includes decentralizing and matching resourses to 
specific needs; efficient budget management is centred on outcome focused policy and managerial autonomy; market 
efficiency includes benchmarking and user choice. These are the intermediate indicators. 
Each intermediate indicator is composed from a series of low-level indicators. Therefore: 
 for decentralization, the low level indicators used are: degree of localised decision making (LL-1), clearly defined 
responsibilities between central government and sub-national authorities (LL-2), clearly defined responsibilities 
among sub-national authorities (LL-3) and consintency in the sharing of responsibilities levels of government 
(LL-4); 
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 for matching resourses to specific needs: taking into account the specific educational context in financing schools 
(LL-5), the specific educational context in managing teachers (LL- -7); 
 for the outcome focused policy: clarity of outcome targets (LL-8), credibility of reward /sanction systems 
associated with educational results (LL-9) and coverage of teachers and schools performance assessment are taken 
into acount (LL-10); 
 for managerial autonomy: flexibility in employment status of teachers in public schools (LL-11), flexibility in 
setting teachers wage (LL-12), degree of involment of schools in teaching methods and budget allocation (LL-13) 
and outsourcing possibilities are used (LL-14); 
 for benchmarking: coverage of benchmarking of pupils performance (LL-15), quality of national  benchmarking 
of pupils performance (LL-16) and use of benchmarking at the school level are employed (LL-17); 
 for user choice: user choice among public schools (LL-18), user choice between public schools and publicly 
financed private schools (LL-19), liberalised framework for user choice (LL-20) and user choice unrestricted by 
school admission policies are employed (LL-21). 
The non-transformed values of the intermediate indicators are obtained from the arithmetic mean of the low-level 
corresponding indicators. The transformed values of intermediate indicators are a result of the geometrical mean of 
the non-transformed values of intermediate indicators and the values of indicators which are complementary to 
intermediate indicators.  
The complementary indicators of the intermediate ones are the following:for decentralization: the non-
transformed value of the intermediate benchmarking indicator; for the outcome focused policy: the non-transformed 
values of intermediate managerial autonomy and benchmarking indicators; for managerial autonomy: the non-
transformed value of the intermediate outcome focused policy indicator; for user choice: the non-transformed value 
of the intermediate benchmarking indicator. 
The mathematic formulae for the transformed value of an intermediate indicator Ij is: 
ll
k
kjj II
/1
1
, , in which Ij,k stands for the value of the k indicator that is complementary to indicator Ij, with 
k>1. The non-transformed value of the intermediate indicator is Ij,1.  The composit indicator is calculated according 
to the following formulae: 
6
6
1j
j
i
I
I , in which Ij stands for the transformed value of the j-ranked intermediate 
indicator. 
2.2. Employed algorithm 
Low-level indicators are determined based on the results obtained from processing the questionnaire. In the case 
of Romania, their value is shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Low-level indicators for Romania 
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Low-level indicators Scores for Romania on a scale from 0 to 10 
LL-1 degree of localised decision making 5 
LL-2 clearly defined responsibilities between central government and sub-national authorities 6 
LL-3 clearly defined responsibilities among sub-national authorities 8 
LL-4 consintency in the sharing of responsibilities levels of government 6,6 
LL-5 taking account of specific educational context in financing schools 5 
LL-6 taking account of specific educational context in managing teachers 2,5 
LL-7 age of first selection 0 
LL-8 clarity of outcome targets 0 
LL-9 credibility of reward /sanction systems associated with educational results 0 
LL-10 coverage of teachers and schools performance assessment 7,5 
LL-11 flexibility in employment status of teachers in public schools 6 
LL-12 flexibility in setting teachers wage 0 
LL-13 degree of involment of schools in teaching methods and budget allocation 0 
LL-14 outsourcing possibilities 10 
LL-15 coverage of benchmarking of pupils performance 10 
LL-16 quality of national  benchmarking of pupils performance 6,25 
LL-17 use of benchmarking at the school level 0 
LL-18 user choice amoung public schools 8,3 
LL-19 user choice between public schools and publicly financed private schools 2,2 
LL-20  liberalised framework for user choice 6 
LL-21 user choice unrestricted by school admision policies 2,5 
Source: computing 
 
2. Non-transformed values for the 6 intermediate indicators are calculated as follows:  
 for decentralization: 
4,6
4
6,6865
1,1I
 
 for matching resourses to specific needs: 
5,2
3
05,25
1,2I
 
 for outcome focused policy: 
5,2
3
5,700
1,3I
 
 for managerial autonomy: 
4
4
10006
1,4I
 
 for benchmarking: 41,5
3
025,610
1,5I  
 for user choice: 
75,4
4
5,262,23,8
1,6I
 
 
3. Transformed values for the 6 intermediate indicators are calculated as follows: 
 for decentralization: 88,52/11,51,11 III  
 for matching resourses to specific needs: 5,21,22 II  
 for outcome focused policy: 
78,33/11,51,41,33 IIII  
 
for managerial autonomy: 16,32/11,31,44 III  
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 for benchmarking: 
41,51,55 II  
 for user choice: 06,52/11,51,66 III  
 
4. The value of the composit index is calculated as follows: 
 
25,4
6
06,514,516,378,35,288,5
ROI  
The values of the three types of efficiency are the following:  
 efficiency of resource allocation 
19,4
2
21 II
 
 efficiency of budget management 
47,3
2
43 II
 
 efficiency of the market 
23,5
2
65 II
  
These results for Romania and the average for the OECD countries as well as for the best practice of OECD are 
shown in table 2. 
Table 2. Institutional framework in Romanian compulsory education 
Intermediate indicators, 
Efficiency categories and  
Composite indicator Values 
OECD 
Average 
OECD best  
Practice 
Romanian 
Average 
1) Efficiency in resource allocation 5,2 7,7 4,19 
Decentralization 6,3 9,6 6,4 
Matching resources to specific needs 5,3 8,3 2,5 
2) Efficiency in budget management 3,3 7,4 3,47 
Outcome focused policy 2,7 7,9 2,5 
Managerial autonomy at the school level 4,8 7,7 4,0 
3) Market efficiency 4,8 8,4 5,23 
Benchmarking 4,9 9,4 5,41 
User choice 5,0 9,5 4,75 
Composite indicator 4,4 7,1 4,25 
Source: Authors computing and presentation based on Gonard, F., Joumard, I., Price, R., Public spending efficiency: institutional 
indicators in Primary and Secondary education, OECD, ECO/WKP, 2007/3 
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2.3. Interpretation of results obtained for Romania 
1) Generally, the efficiency in resource allocation is a criterion for institutional efficiency at the macroeconomic 
level as the balance between budgetary expenditure and revenues alongside with a good provision on the long term 
for this report. In the case of education, the efficiency of public subsidies depends on other two institutional 
arrangements, i.e. the degree of decentralization and matching the resources to specific needs. 
The decentralization is about who is involved in solving some of the problems that schools have: central 
authorities such as Ministry of Education, the local authorities such as School Inspectorates or City Councils, unions 
or schools themselves. A high level of centralization leaves some of the problems unaddressed, but also, a high level 
of decentralization leads to difficult situations due to lack of responsibility. It is why there is a need to clearly define 
responsibilities to every party involved. Thus, the efficiency of this indicator would equal a high degree of 
decentralization that is a clear division of tasks among sub-national authorities. From this point of view, the best 
practices belong to Denmark and Finland amongst the OECD countries; at the opposite pole, with respect to the 
decentralization degree, there are the countries in which the centralization degree is higher and decentralization is 
less consistently designed as in Slovakia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Austria, Netherlands and France (Gonand et al., 
2007, p.11).  
As it can be observed in table 1, for Decentralization due to the quite clear distribution of responsibilities between 
local in central authorities, Romania has a 5.9 scoring in this field, which is close to the OECD average. The lowest 
score for low level indicators in Romania is the degree of localised decision making (5) while clearly defined 
responsibilities among sub-national authorities (8) is the highest, which gives our country a very good position 
among the OECD countries. However, the Romanian educational system may be considered to be a highly 
centralized one due to a small number of administrative positions in schools, i.e. 4 of the 16 considered positions, the 
rest pertaining to the responsibility of local (The School Inspectorate) or national (The Ministry of Education) 
authorities. The most important functions the school is responsible for are general budget assessment and its division; 
the functions that the inspectorate or ministry and not the school are not responsible of concern human resources 
management (employment, firing, salary differences), set up of educational programmes or special educational 
needs.    
with less favored socio-economic background, or rewarding teachers that have outstanding teaching results. The 
efficiency of this indicator is the capacity of this system to take into account a specific educational context in 
-economic background; taking 
account of specific educational context in managing teachers; and the age of first selection whith should not bee too 
low (under 15). The best results for this indicator are encountered in Portugal, Japan, New Zealand and Italy, while 
Turkey and Austria are at the opposite pole. A high degree of dispersion of low level indicators shows inconsistency 
in the policies of matching resources to specific needs, as in Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Spain and 
United Kingdom. In Romania, the score for matching resources to specific needs is 2.5 as opposed to the 5.3 OECD 
average. As it can be observed in table 1, this scoring is bad because there are no resources to be invested in areas 
where results are low or the pupils that have a poor economic and/or social background, nor there are financial 
incentives for the outstanding teaching results. Moreover, the age of the first selection is 11, i.e. when children are 
enrolled in secondary school; although there are no legal provisions in this sense, top schools (i.e. national high 
-
for the most disadvantaged children to be deprived of education is higher as the aforementioned study shows.  
Overall, the situation of efficiency in resource allocation is shown in figure 1. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
Great Britain have the best practices for efficiency in resource allocation; they have high values for the indicator and 
low dispersion while Turkey and Belgium (F1.) are to be found at the opposite pole, with low values for the indicator 
and high dispersion of intermediate indicators the Czech Republic or Greece belonging to the same group, as well.   
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Figure 1. Efficiency in resource allocation 
2) The efficiency in budget management is a dimension of institutional efficiency at the micro level which refers 
to the correlation between profit and performance. In the case of education, the efficiency in budget management is 
based on two indicators, i.e. intermediary outcome focused policy and managerial autonomy at the school level. 
Outcome focused policy is supposed to reflect the existence of vision that cares for results and is based on 
administrative incentives (support or penalties). An increased efficiency for this indicator would be reflected in clear 
educational targets that are an efficient evaluation system, an appropriate system of rewards and penalties and a 
coherent system for publishing the results obtained. The best results for this indicator are encountered in Slovakia, 
Mexico, United States and Turkey, Italy and Iceland being at the opposite pole. In the intermediate position, 
countries in which the dispersion of low level indicators is high reveal a low policy consistency; this is the case of 
the Flemish Community in The Netherlands, New Zealand and Belgium. 
Again, in this case too, Romania scores a very low evaluation due to the lack of reforms in educational policies 
based on educational outcome. Although there was much debate on this issue, outcome focused policies were never 
implemented. The only low level indicator which attracts a positive score for Romania is the coverage of teachers 
and schools performance assessment (7, 5) because the results of national tests and school competitions are made 
public in a systhematic manner. Due to the fact that policies based on aims are not implemented in Romanian 
education, our country has weak results at standardized tests.  
Managerial autonomy at the school level is about the status of employment, personel mobility and the secure and 
fair payment at school level. This indicator is strongly related with efficiency of public spending in education 
cies and to work 
with proficient teachers in a manner to be found satisfactory for both parties. Three of the four low level indicators 
that make it up, i.e. flexibility in employment status of teachers in public schools, flexibility in setting teachers wage 
and the degree of involment of schools in teaching methods and budget allocation are complementary, being 
significantly correlated among OECD countries. The best practices for managerial autonomy are encountered in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Slovakia, New Zealand, and Australia. At the same time, manager autonomy is low 
in Luxembourg, Iceland, Greece, and Italy.  
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Again, the Romanian score in this matter is lower then the OECD average as there is a weak managerial 
autonomy. For low level indicators flexibility in setting teachers wage and degree of involment of schools in teaching 
methods and budget allocation the score is 0 as in clarity of outcome targets and credibility of reward /sanction 
systems associated with educational results, which underlines the idea that manager autonomy and outcome focused 
policies are the sources of increased efficiency in the educational system. Consequently, weak results for these 
indicators may be a starting point for reforming proposals in Romanian education.  
W
subcontracting basic services (such as foreign language courses) or auxiliary services (such as canteen or library 
services). In Romania, there are many formal obstacles in the way of outsourcing as a source of real competion 
which would increase budget efficiency at the school level. Thus, even a good result for this indicator may raise 
ly done in education. This makes room for an increase in 
systemacy for the implementation of public policies.  
Overall, the situation of efficiency in budget management is shown in figure 2. The best practices for efficiency in 
budget management belong to the US, Slovakia and New Zealand while Iceland, Luxembourg and Italy are the least 
efficient. Romania is located in the framework with medium values of the indicator, having a rather low dispersion, 
as well as Portugal and Germany.  
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Figure 2. Efficiency in budget management 
3) Market efficiency is the third feature of institutional efficiency which combines micro and macro elements as 
profit and performance at a micro level depend on the individual capacity to be receptive and adapt to market signals, 
but also on the macro characteristics of the system in which competition must be dominant. This feature is observed 
in the case of education by means of benchmarking and user choice, both ensuring the efficiency of educational 
activity and the allocation of public funds.  
Benchmarking is the comparative analysis of activities through identifying the weak and strong points in 
comparison with those of the others. It is a strong instrument in increasing competition. However, one of the risks of 
decentralization is that of not being able to use benchmarking efficiently, due to a negative relation between quality 
of national benchmarking of pupil performance and the degree of localised decision making at a sub-national level 
(Gonand et al., 2007, p.12). Thus, when efficiency increase by means of decentralization is desired, decision-making 
liability of sub-national authorities needs consolidation through equal standars at a national level.  
The best practices for this indicator are in Hungary, The United Kingdom, Slovakia, Iceland and The Netherlands, 
while Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Finland and Czech Republic are at the opposite pole.  
Here Romania scores better then the OECD average. The good score comes from the fact that national evaluation 
results are made public and there are periodic or based on results inspections in schools. Yet the use of benchmarking 
at the school level remain unaddressed (0). This situation can be explained when compared to the other low level 
indicators with nul values in the case of Romania; they pertain to the outcome focused policies and managerial 
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autonomy, such as clarity of outcome targets, credibility of reward /sanction systems associated with educational 
results, flexibility in setting teachers wage and degree of involment of schools in teaching methods and budget 
allocation. To conclude, the peformance of education could be ameliorated if the three indicators were 
complementarily observed in the reformation process.  
User choice is about the right of pupils and/or their families to chose the school they prefer. This determines 
setting of an ierarchy based on results, making the system very competitive. This indicator has good values in the 
countries in which the private sector is well represented or where the money principle rules with respect to pu
education making them able to chose what school to follow according to the performance criterion. The best 
practices belong to Belgium, Netherlands and Spain, while Turkey, France, Greece, Austria and Mexico are at the 
opposite pole.  
Again, Romania scores lower then the OECD average because there are some factors that limit the user choice in 
public schools, be it the size of school buildinds, related to transportation or of other nature; moreover, the 
cation  which may lead to the existence of private schools partially 
financed by the state is not operational in Romania. Therefore, user choice is an instrument for the increase in 
competition between top public schools with gate-keeping strategies and private schools with a lower demand and no 
selection process.  
The private area in Romanian compulsory education has gradually increased during the past years; however, it has 
not become a serious competion factor for public education which still enrolls 3,31% of pupils at the high school 
level and 0,22% of pupils at the primary and secondary level (National Institute of Statistics, 2009). 
Overall, the situation of market efficiency is shown in figure 3.  
 
8.006.004.002.00
Degree of market efficiency
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
S
ta
nd
ar
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
in
di
ca
to
rs
ro
tur
swe
svk
prt
nzl
nor
nld
mex
lux
isl
hun
gre
fin
esp
che
bel(f.)
bel(fl.)
aut
aus
can
ita
gbr
fra
deu
jpn
usa
 
Figure 3. Market Efficiency  
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Of the three efficiency indicators, Romania has the best position with respect to the indicator above as it is above 
average in the value framework of indicators, having a low dispersion, as well as Portugal or Luxembourg. Iceland 
and The Netherlands have the best position, while Austria, The Czech Republic and Belgium (Fl.) are the least 
efficient.  
shown in figure 4. The countries with the best position are located in framework 2, having high values for the 
indicator and low dispersions. Romania is part of the countries in this framework, but holds the lowest position, with 
a medium value of the indicator, the lowest in this group. However, the categories of efficiency that make up the 
composite indicator are well balanced as dispersion is relatively low. The highest inbalance is registered in Great 
Britain and the Netherlands, the countries with the highest values for this indicator.  
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Figure 4. Composit indicators 
As a general remark, institutional features influence the quality of education (Woessmann, 2010). For this reason 
in the OECD countries where the scores for the intermediate indicators are high (Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Norway, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Finland and Denmark), the results of education are also above the 
average, in terms of results PISA tests (according to Ammermueller, 2007, Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). 
Romania has very poor results at PISA tests (PISA 2009 Results) and, as expected, very weak results at many of the 
analysed institutional efficiency indicators, of which matching resources to specific needs, outcome focused policy, 
and managerial autonomy. 
3. Final remarks 
The main conclusion is that the results of education cannot be interpreted outside the institutional context, and 
confirms that the poor results of Romanian pupils in terms of cognitive skills and educational outcomes may be 
related to certain institutional characteristics of the educational system that lead to inefficiency. 
Decentralization and managerial autonomy are the institutional features that could ensure increased efficiency in 
utilizing budget resources and making sure that the allotted supplementary resources get there where they are most 
needed. The decentralization of the educational system makes sense if it is corroborated with certain objectives: 
better adjustment of the educational syllabi to local or regional needs, better adjustment of the educational curricula 
to specific needs etc. Moreover, decentralization must be achieved so that the responsibility of sub-national   
authorities in quality observation and control and budget efficiency increase. This is especially due to the fact that 
corruption is still an issue in Romania and government indicators have disadvantaging values. Thus, the risk related 
awareness of schools and local school inspectorates.   
Poor results in standard tests for Romanian pupils have shown a reduced decision-making power to offer solutions 
for remedial strategies. Measures or reforms to solve the situation are expected from a centralized source. However, 
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the quality of the educational activity is closely linked to clarity of outcome targets, credibility of reward /sanction 
systems associated with educational results, flexibility in setting teachers wage, degree of involment of schools in 
teaching methods and budget allocation and to the set up of education programmes or special educational needs, as 
well as the increase in responsibility and managerial autonomy at the school level. The performance of Romanian 
education could be seriously improved if outcome focused policies, managerial autonomy and the use of 
benchmarking at the school level would be observed in a complementary manner in the set up of educational policies 
and strategies.  
In the case of Romania, an increase in the budgetary autonomy of schools can function as an institutional reform 
to complement the funding-according-to-results system. If schools do not have managerial as well as accounting and 
flexibility and autonomy respectively in hiring the staff and in selecting the teaching methods, in setting the payment 
are just some of the possible ways of improving results. Higher payment in itself is not enough; it has to be 
associated by an increased quality of the teachi
performance, the only thing capable of leading to a good social and professional development and a much better life 
for everyone.  
Increased competition among schools and the possibility 
very powerful institutional and useful instruments to improve the results of education (Ammermueller et al, 2005, 
Schuetz et al, 2008). The per pupil financing, according to the principle the financing follows the pupil, could ensure 
an increased quality of educational activity, since better schools would attract more pupils and therefore more 
money. The institutional framework would be thus created so that public money would be directed towards quality. 
-
seriously reduced and even the poorest children would be able to have a choice in quality education and the schools 
could develop their infrastructure so as to adjust to the existing educational needs.  
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